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ABSTRACT 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE SITING PROCEDURE FOR RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
MANAGEMENT FACILITY IN KOREA 
 
By 
 
Sun-Mi Wee 
 
 
 
With the world struggling due to a lack of sufficient energy, nuclear power has 
become an indispensable power source. The need for safe management of nuclear related 
facilities has increased in unison with an increased use of nuclear energy. The effective 
management of radioactive waste has become a significant national issue in Korea. Korea had 
struggled to select an appropriate site for its radioactive waste management facility and ever 
since 1986, there have been many conflicts and concerns regarding safety and reliability of 
the facility. After much deliberation, the Korean government finally selected the Gyeongju 
repository site by way of referendum in November, 2005. This study analyzes the key factors 
and procedures which resulted in the selection of Gyeongju as the waste management site as 
well as major differences between this location and the other unsuccessful options.  
This study examines whether or not the referendum is useful with regards to 
radioactive waste site selection and in which ways it can be differentiated from other 
procedures pertaining to the site’s selection. This study will cover many issues, including 1) 
the way that Korea selected the radioactive waste facility in Gyeongju – how the path of 
selection process has changed 2) the history of and common factors dictating site selection 
processes in other countries, 3) lessons learned from the Gyeongju case and how these 
 ii 
 
lessons can be developed for future implementation.
 
 
The Gyeongju case is analyzed by the point of periodical changes, and changes in 
approach. There are a certain characteristic aspects of approach – change of compensation, 
diversification of deliberation structure, and enlargement of local people participation. 
Despite a great deal of effort on their part, Korea failed on several occasions to select a 
suitable site, but reached a turning point following the introduction of the referendum, with 
public receptivity changing dramatically.  
In addition to analyzing the Korean case, this study also analyzes the experiences of 
countries like Canada, United Kingdom, and France, who have also encountered similar 
obstacles when attempting to settle on a site location for radioactive waste management 
facilities. Indeed, thorough periodic research demonstrates the approach taken by these 
countries and assesses the success of these approaches.  
In conclusion, policy acceptance level is determined on the base of trust between residents 
and policy executors, whilst decision a making process should have openness and 
transparency. With this in mind, the policy makers should attempt to enhance community 
participation in all phases of the siting process by showing their support for independent 
consultants, community review of facility design and safety systems, monitoring of facility 
performance and property value protection. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Background 
 
  With the world struggling due to a lack of sufficient energy, nuclear power has 
become an indispensable power source. A total of 436 nuclear power plants are currently 
in operation with a total net installed capacity of 370,128 MWe.
1
  
 As the use of nuclear energy increases, the need for safe management of nuclear 
related facilities has also increased. In fact, the safety and energy efficiency of nuclear 
power has been at the center of worldwide debate since the 1950s. People have been 
worried about the long-term effects of nuclear power plants and their waste products. Of 
particular note is the radioactive waste treatment issue which has emerged as a serious 
matter in terms of sustainable development, not only in South Korea but also in other 
countries which use a vast amount of nuclear energy.  
 In the case of the United States, the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository 
was designated as the deep geological repository storage facility for the country’s spent 
nuclear reactor fuel and other high level radioactive waste. Although the appropriateness 
of the location had been rigorously opposed by environmentalists, this waste site was 
deemed effective with the passing of the federal budget by Congress on April 14, 2011 
following pressure from the Obama Administration. Indeed, this freed up funding for the 
development of Yucca Mountain. The US GAO stated that the closure was due to political 
reasons rather than technical or safety reasons.
2
 
 With regards to Belgium, this country has seven nuclear reactors in operation 
with a net MWe of 5,761. Nuclear energy provides 54% of the country’s energy, and it 
                                           
1
 Power Reactor Information System (PRIS), IAEA, http://pris.iaea.org/Wedas/WEDAS.asp 
2 Hannah Northey, "Gao: Death of Yucca Mountain Caused by Political Maneuvering,"(2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/10/10greenwire-gao-death-of-yucca-mountain-caused-by-politica-
36298.html?pagewanted=allzz 
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was only in 2006 that the government decided low-level and short-lived intermediate-
level wastes should be disposed of in a surface repository at Desseli. Before the site 
selection of Desseli, ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian agency for radioactive waste and 
enriched fissile materials attempted to select 98 candidate sites based on scientific and 
industrial factors, however all of the candidate sites refused to participate in this 
feasibility study. Moreover, countries such as Canada, United Kingdom, and France have 
also gone through similar experiences with regards to settling on a site for radioactive 
waste management facilities. 
A total of 21 nuclear reactors are currently in operation in Korea, with this 
number set to rise to 28 by 2015. With this in mind, the effective management of 
radioactive waste has become a significant national issue. In 1986, Korea was struggling 
to select a site which could house the radioactive waste management facility. Indeed, 
since this date, there have been many conflicts and concerns regarding the safety and 
reliability of the facility. After much deliberation, the Korean government finally chose 
the Gyeongju repository site by way of referendum in November, 2005. This study 
analyzes the key factors and procedures which resulted in the selection of Gyeongju as a 
waste disposal site as well as the major differences between this site and other failed 
candidates.  
 
B. Purpose of the Study and Research Method  
 
This study analyzes whether or not a referendum is useful with regards to 
radioactive waste site selection and how it can be differentiated from the other procedures 
of site selection.  
My research question pertains to the Gyeongju case, and more specifically 
whether or not the use of referendum to select a radioactive waste management site was 
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the most effective and efficient method by which to solve the public dispute. The 
hypothesis of this study states that use of referendum in the siting procedure could be an 
effective democratic option and a way of forming a consensus with local people. This 
study is of a comparative nature, and analyzes the procedures of previously failed site 
candidates whilst also conducting periodical research into other countries’ cases. In 
conclusion, this study will cover a number of issues, including 1) the way in which Korea 
selected the radioactive waste facility in Gyeongju – how the path of selection process has 
changed 2) the history and common factors of siting processes in the case of other 
countries, 3) lesson learned from the Gyeongju case and how these lessons can be 
developed for future implementation.
 
 
This thesis covers Korea’s experience from 1986 to 2005 at the domestic level, 
and analyzes characteristic aspects of the referendum and consensus building process of 
2005. I found that in Korea there were many diverse studies regarding this issue, the 
majority of which were analyzing this siting procedure as a point of governance, social 
trust and risk communication.  
This study will go one step further than previous studies by conducting a 
comparative analysis of other countries’ cases. Many countries – almost all of which are 
developed countries – have experienced trials and errors when attempting to establish 
radioactive waste management facilities. A number of these countries have succeeded, 
whilst others are still in the process of selection, and many have failed. The siting 
procedure has changed with the passing of time, and it can now be evaluated and 
categorized as a point of public perception and success rate. With this in mind, the present 
study attempts to analyze the periodic characteristics of other countries’ cases in order to 
improve policy adaptability. In addition, this study will also analyze the potential conflicts 
which remain following the site’s selection and will attempt to provide a policy 
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suggestion in order to contribute to the developing process of consensus for the siting of 
radioactive waste management facilities. The review of this site selection process could 
well provide a valuable insight for countries which use a vast amount of nuclear energy or 
countries which plan to introduce nuclear energy in the near future.  
Following the Fukushima crisis (in Japan, 2011 March) and recent explosions at a 
French nuclear waste treatment site (2011 September),
3
 nuclear industries have begun to 
encounter a huge amount of criticism and opposing movements. One of the main reasons 
for criticism stems from the way in which the government deals with this crisis. In the 
case of Japan, events in its history, along with a lack of transparency, have led to a great 
deal of public skepticism. Indeed, the public are opposed to the siting of radioactive waste 
treatment facilities and feel that these situations should be reviewed using the mechanism 
of risk communication and decision making process in order to formulate more 
productive solutions.  
 
 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Theoretical Background 
Risk Perception 
 Ever since the psychometric studies carried out by Slovic & Fischhoff in the 
1970s, risk research has been influenced by a wide range of theoretical perspectives and 
has developed various related subjects. Taylor-Gooby & Zinn constructed a two 
dimensional model intended to exemplify certain features of recent research regarding 
risk as shown in Fig. 1.
4
 They asserted that “recent developments reflect a general move 
                                           
3
 "Action Plan after Nuclear Blast Kills One in France," (2011), http://tvnz.co.nz/world-news/action-plan-
after-nuclear-blast-kills-one-in-france-4398133. 
4
 Peter Taylor-Gooby & Jens O. Zinn, “Current Directions in Risk Research: New Developments in 
Psychology and Sociology,” Risk Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2006) : 407. 
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to acknowledge the significance of social and cultural factors more seriously in 
understanding risk.” They then concluded that these two trends bring “developments in 
psychology and sociology closer together and opens up opportunities for cross-
disciplinary research.”5 The two dimensions shown in Fig. 1 are concerned with ontology 
and particularity. At an ontological level, two extremes are constructionist and realist 
views. From the perspective of a realist, risks are to be understood as real, as having an 
independent existence, external to the individuals or social groups who perceive and 
respond to them. 
 
Figure. 1 Psychological and sociological approaches to risk (Source: Taylor & Zinn, 2006, p.407) 
 
 As developments were made regarding the psychometric approach, it began to 
include constructionism. Taylor-Gooby & Zinn stated that “constructionism enters to the 
extent that social factors may, for example, influence the mental modeling that generates 
a particular prioritizing of risk.”6  They concluded that new research directions for the 
interdisciplinary approach between sociology and psychology were necessary. Indeed, 
they stated that “opportunities for closer linkages between the two disciplines are 
                                           
5
 Ibid., 397. 
6
 Ibid., 408 
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emerging, which may enable development of psychological ideas in the context of the 
broader and more holistic conceptualizations of sociology, and more rigorous testing of 
the theories of sociologists, drawing on the methods and conceptual distinctions 
developed by psychologists.”7 
 Up until the 1980s, the risks of nuclear energy had been perceived as 
qualitatively different from those of other activities. These risks were regarded as highly 
involuntary, unknown, delayed, new, uncontrollable, fatal, dread and catastrophic as 
shown in Fig. 2. Indeed, with this in mind it is no surprise that nuclear related risks 
ranked very highly in comparison to other risks. Indeed, we can easily observe the field of 
nuclear energy due to the remarkable isolated position of nuclear power.
8
 Fischhoff et al. 
stated that people “viewed the risks from nuclear power as qualitatively different from 
those of the other activities.”9 
 
Figure.2 Location of 81 hazards on factors derived from the relationship among 18 risk 
characteristics (Source: Slovic, 1987, p.236) 
                                           
7
 Ibid., 409 
8
 Paul Slovic, “Perception of Risk”, Science, New Series, Vol. 236, No. 4799. (Apr. 17, 1987) : 282 
9
 Baruch Fischhoff, Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein, “How safe is safe enough? A psychometric study of 
attitudes towards technological risks and benefits”, Policy Sciences 9 (1978) : 147 
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 The overall worldwide attitude regarding the nuclear industry remains negative. 
Indeed, Slovic et al. conducted a survey of American citizens using images related to a 
nuclear waste repository. In this survey, “respondents were asked to indicate the first 
thoughts or images that come to mind when they think of underground nuclear waste 
repository.”10 The results were divided into two sizeable categories, namely “negative 
consequences” and “negative concepts” such as “dangerous”, “unsafe”, “toxic”, 
“disaster”, and so on. These “negative concepts” accounted for more than 56% of the total 
number of images, with positive imagery proving rare. Taylor summarized the survey 
results of the European Union and concluded that the average European is worried about 
radioactive waste and the nuclear industry is trusted by very few people.
11
 In reference to 
a Korean case, Lee & Lee conducted a survey of Gyeongju citizens regarding the image 
of radioactive waste facilities, and concluded that the waste facility was closely related to 
negative imagery which had clearly emerged from opposition to the facility.
12
 
 
Environmental Conflict 
The word ‘conflict’ finds its origins in the Latin word ‘confligere’, which consists 
of ‘con’ (with) and ‘fligere’ (crash). Conflict is generally defined as a serious 
disagreement or argument between two or more beliefs, ideas, or interests. Conflicts 
between certain groups over the use of the environment and natural resources are now 
common occurrences and are growing both in number and importance as the human 
                                           
10 Paul Slovic and others, “Perceived Risk, Trust, and the politics of Nuclear Waste” Sciences 254 (1991): 
1605. 
11 Derek M. Taylor, “The Management of Radioactive Waste in the European Union — Opinions, Situation 
and Proposal for Changes.”, Practice Periodical of Hazardous, Toxic, and Radioactive Waste Management, 
9(1), (2005) : 19. 
12 Nakeung Lee and Yong-Ai Lee, “Factors affecting decision making concerning the location of a nuclear 
waste repository. ”, 2005 PMORP WORKSHOP : Pyschological Mechanism of Risk Perception (2005) : 32. 
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population grows, technology changes, and as pressures to use the environment 
increase.
13
 
Environmental conflicts are rooted in the different values which people place on 
natural resources and environmental quality. Environmental conflicts are also incited by 
different stakes in the outcome of environmental and natural resource management 
decisions.
14
 According to Emerson, environmental conflicts are characterized by certain 
key elements, including whether or not they: (1) involve the environment, natural 
resources, public lands, or all three; (2) involve multiple parties engaged in a decision 
making process who disagree about the endpoint or impacts of choices or outcomes; and 
(3) are general public disputes.
15
 
 
B. Literature Review 
Since the 1990s, many studies have been conducted regarding the issue of site 
selection procedures for radioactive waste management facilities in Korea. Initial studies 
primarily focused on analyzing the reasons behind opposition to Locally Unwanted Land 
Uses, whilst later studies, in contrast, approached this matter from the perspective of 
policy failure.  
Jeon emphasized the importance of understanding the differences of a discourse 
which is a base of pros and cons, to solve nuclear related disputes.
16
 The basic discourse 
of pro-radioactive waste management facility is neutral, and involves the prioritization of 
                                           
13
 Thomas Gladwin, “Trends in Industrial Environmental Conflict.” Environmental Consensus 3 
(September 1979): 1 
14 James E. Crowfoot and Julia M. Wondolleck, Environmental Disputes : Community Involvement in 
Conflict Resolution (Washington D.C: Island Press, 1990) : 6-7 
 
15
 Kirk Emerson et al., The Challenges of Environmental Conflict Resolution, in THE PROMISE AND   
 PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3 (Rosemary O'Leary & Lisa    
 B. Bingham eds., 2003) : 4 
16
 Jin Seok Jeon, “The study on Policy Change for Building the Nuclear Waste Dump through Advocacy 
Coalition Framework”, Study of Local Government, Korean Local Government Society, Vol.7, No.4 (2003) : 
183 
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science and technology. From this perspective, radioactive wastes are indispensable by-
products of nuclear energy, and siting matters can be resolved through the development of 
science and technology. On the other hand, the basic discourse of anti-nuclear site is 
ecology. They regard the crisis of civilized society as stemming from an excessive 
development of science, which can and should be solved using an ecological approach 
and prioritizing the environment. For them, the fundamental issue with regards to siting 
radioactive waste management facilities is the use of nuclear energy. Indeed, they 
prioritize making ‘social consensus on energy without nuclear’, and also seek the 
establishment of a safety control system which uses existing nuclear power plant sites 
efficientlyd.
17
 Similarly, Lee viewed the conflict on siting as the debate between techno-
centeredness and ecology following his analysis of the Ulchin case.
18
 
 The characteristic aspect of radioactive waste management facilities as 
environmental goods which are shown under the collision among basic discourses should 
be considered. Slovic found behavioral mechanisms whereby development of the 
radioactive waste management facility may have serious impacts on tourism, migration, 
and economic development. These mechanisms of perceived risk, signal, social 
amplification, and stigma are so powerful that well publicized problems associated with 
the repository have the potential to result in substantial losses for each of the various 
economic sectors at risk. Therefore, the possibility of these impacts should no longer be 
ignored in repository-planning decisions.
19
 
  
                                           
17
 Sohee Kim, “ Remained task and significance of demonstration against the radioactive waste disposal 
site in Gulup Island”, Environment and Life (1995) 
18 Jong Youl Lee, “The anti nuclear wastes disposal sites: The case of Ulchin”, Korean Association for 
Public Administration, Vol.29, No.2 (1995) : 379~396 
19
 Paul Slovic, “Perceived Risk, Stigma, and Potential Economic Impacts of a High-Level Nuclear Waste 
Repository in Nevada”, Economic Impacts of a Repository in Nevada (1991) : 141. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF SITING PROCEDURE OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
MANAGEMENT FACILITY IN KOREA 
A. Status of Nuclear Energy and the Necessity of Radioactive Waste management in 
Korea 
 From the early 1960s to the late 1990s, Korea had one of the world's fastest 
growing economies, and it has continued to represent one of the fastest growing countries 
in the 2000s. In 2010, Korea was the sixth largest exporter and the tenth largest importer 
in the world. Korea's nominal GDP per capita grew from $103 in 1962 to $7,276 in 1991, 
reaching $20,759 in 2011.
20
 With few fossil fuel resources, South Korea has sought to 
harness nuclear energy as a means by which to secure the country’s rapid economic 
development. Over the last three decades, South Korea has averaged 8.6% annual GDP 
growth, with a corresponding leap in electricity consumption. In 1980, the country 
consumed some 40,078 Giga Watt hours (GWh), which had risen by 2010 to around 
495,745 GWh. Today, 23 reactors account for 22% of South Korea’s total capacity but 
actually provide 30% of the country’s electricity. 21  A further 9 plants are in the 
construction or planning phases. Indeed, this will further increase the nuclear share in the 
country’s electricity consumption, which is projected to reach 56% of electricity supply 
by 2020.  
 Nuclear activities were initiated when South Korea became a member of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957. In 1958, the Atomic Energy Law was 
passed and the Office of Atomic Energy was established by the government in 1959. The 
first nuclear reactor to achieve criticality in South Korea was a small research unit in 
1962. Ten years later construction began of the first nuclear power plant - Kori-1, a 
Westinghouse unit built on turnkey contract. It started up in 1977 and achieved 
commercial operation in 1978.  
                                           
20 "Economic Statistics System," Bank of Korea, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/. last modified August 3 2011. 
21 "Electric Power Statistics Information System," Korea Power Exchange, http://epsis.kpx.or.kr/. 
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Table 1. Power reactors operation in South Korea  
Reactor Type Net capacity 
Commercial 
Operation   
Planned 
Close   
Kori 1 PWR - Westinghouse 576 MWe 4/’78 2017 
Kori 2 PWR - Westinghouse 637 MWe 7/’83   
Wolsong 1 PHWR - Candu 6 666 MWe 4/’83 2036 
Kori 3 PWR - Westinghouse 1007 MWe 9/’85   
Kori 4  PWR - Westinghouse 1007 MWe 4/’86   
Yonggwang 1 PWR - Westinghouse 953 MWe 8/’86   
Yonggwang 2  PWR - Westinghouse 947 MWe 6/’87   
Ulchin 1 PWR - Framatome 945 MWe 9/’88   
Ulchin 2 PWR - Framatome 942 MWe 9/’89   
Yonggwang 3 PWR (Syst 80) 997 MWe 12/’95   
Yonggwang 4 PWR (Syst 80) 994 MWe 3/’96   
Wolsong 2 PHWR - Candu 710 MWe 7/’97   
Wolsong 3 PHWR - Candu 707 MWe 7/’98   
Wolsong 4 PHWR - Candu 708 MWe 10/’99   
Ulchin 3 OPR-1000 994 MWe 8/’98   
Ulchin 4 OPR-1000 998 MWe 12/’99   
Yonggwang 5 OPR-1000 988 MWe 5/’02   
Yonggwang 6 OPR-1000 996 MWe 12/’02   
Ulchin 5 OPR-1000 1001 MWe 7/’04   
Ulchin 6 OPR-1000 1001 MWe 4/’05   
Shin Kori 1 OPR-1000 1001 MWe 2/’11   
 Shin Kori 2 OPR-1000 1001 MWe 6/’12   
 Shin Wolsong 1 OPR-1000 1001 MWe 6/’12   
Total: 21 20,787 MWe 
 
 (Source: World Nuclear Association, 2012.) 
 The South Korean energy policy has been driven by considerations of energy 
security and the need to minimize dependence on current imports. The policy 
recommends that nuclear power be maintained as a major element of electricity 
production. The Ministry of Education, Science & Technology's third comprehensive 
nuclear energy development plan, for 2007-11, projected that South Korea should develop 
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its nuclear industry into one of the top five in the world, with approximately 60% of its 
electricity coming from nuclear sources by 2035.
22
 
Table 2. South Korean reactors under construction, on order or planned  
Reactor Type Gross capacity 
Start 
construction 
Commercial 
operation 
Shin Wolsong 2 OPR-1000 1000 MWe September 2008  1/2013 
Shin Kori 3 APR-1400 1350 MWe October 2008  9/2013 
Shin Kori 4 APR-1400 1350 MWe August 2009  9/2014 
Shin Ulchin 1 APR-1400 1350 MWe Sept 2012 4/2017 
Shin Ulchin 2 APR-1400 1350 MWe Sept 2013 4/2018 
Shin Kori 5 APR-1400 1350 MWe 8/2014  12/2018 
Shin Kori 6 APR-1400 1350 MWe 8/2015 12/2019 
Shin Wolsong 3 APR-1400 1350 MWe   6/2020 
Shin Wolsong 4 APR-1400 1350 MWe   6/2021 
Total 9   12,200 MWe      
(Source: World Nuclear Association, 2012.) 
 Korea is currently attempting to export its own nuclear power plant technology to 
other countries which have a plan to introduce nuclear energy. As of January 2010, 
Korean companies reached the agreement to build a research reactor in Jordan, and four 
APR-1400 reactors in the United Arab Emirates.
 23
  
 These nuclear reactors are ingenerating radioactive wastes - high-level waste 
(spent nuclear fuel) and low levels of waste. Low-level waste (LLW) comprises paper, 
rags, tools, clothing, filters, and so on. Indeed, these items contain only small amounts of 
mostly short-lived radioactivity. Materials which originate from any region of an Active 
Area are commonly designated as LLW as a precautionary measure even if there is only a 
remote possibility of radioactive contamination. Such LLW typically exhibits 
radioactivity no higher than one would expect from the same material disposed of in a 
                                           
22 “Nuclear Power in South Korea”, World Nuclear Association, (22 February 2012), http://world-
nuclear.org/info/inf81.html. 
23 David Adam Stott, "South Korea's Global Nuclear Ambitions," The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus  
(March 22, 2010), http://japanfocus.org/-David_Adam-Stott/3322. 
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non-active area, such as a normal office block. 
 Low level waste has been stored in temporary storehouses at various nuclear 
power plant sites, and it will be saturated in 2014. With this in mind, the government has 
been attempting to select radioactive waste disposal site since 1986.  
 
B. Procedures of Radioactive Waste Management Facility Siting: 1986-2004 
 The radioactive waste management facility issue has been at the top of the 
governmental agenda since 1984. The Korean government set up a ‘fundamental principle 
for management of radioactive waste material’ at the 211th Atomic Energy Committee. 
The content of the principle is to build a permanent inland facility for managing medium-
low levels of radioactive waste outside of nuclear power sites. In 1986, the Korean 
government revised the ‘Atomic Energy Act’ and established the ‘Atomic Energy 
Commission’ whilst also designating KAERI (Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute) 
as the organization to manage radioactive waste disposal site selection. As a result of field 
investigations, Ulchin, Yeongdeok, and Yeongwol were selected although these 
selections were dismissed due to resistance from local people.  
 With the passing of time, the nuclear power plant issue has become a social 
matter, with the anti movement becoming more organized. The anti-nuclear movement 
started in 1987, as a claim for compensation in the fishing industry. However, at that time, 
the government did not recognize the social change which occurs alongside policy 
implementation. Indeed, as a result of this, the first impression citizens had of 
‘Radioactive waste’ was that ‘Nuclear waste’ is synonymous with negative words such as 
opposition, resistance, and demonstration.
24
 
In 1990, KAERI initiated the ‘2nd Atomic Energy Research Institute’ on Anmyon 
                                           
24 Seong Kyong Cho, The Reverse Side of the Radioactive Waste Management Facility - the Danger on 
Doma (Defend Only My Area) (Seoul: SERI, 2005).p.42. 
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Island in cooperation with the local government, Chungcheongnam-do (Southern 
Chungcheong province). As a matter of fact, this institute acted as a radioactive waste 
disposal site in accordance with the concept of a subordinate agency, despite being known 
as ‘Seohae (west sea) science research center.’ This plan was eventually exposed by a 
major newspaper. Indeed, the way in which journalists obtain certain information is 
highly controversial – do they come across it by accident or is it intentional? This 
produces contrary evidence that a sufficient consensus does not exist inside the 
government. Residents came to know the original purpose of this plan, and opposed it 
vehemently under the exertion of governmental power. The decision was eventually 
reversed in 1991. This Anmyon Island case policy was doomed for failure from the very 
beginning. Even the government, a main agent of decision making, could not reach a 
consensus regarding this. Naturally, it was impossible to introduce the concept of 
legitimacy, participation and democratic process. Although it was a very initial stage of 
the promotional activity, the anti-nuclear movement expressed its views through various 
channels such as print-outs, presentations, and man to man meetings. Despite this, the 
government did not consider introducing an education process or any promotional 
material with could provide people with a more thorough understanding of the issues.  
 Following this, the government legislated the ‘Radioactive Waste Management 
Program Promotion and Assistance on Periphery Area Act’, and committed the 
preliminary consultation with local residents and assistance to the site by the law. At the 
heart of this law, Yangsan and Ulchin were designated as candidate sites, although this 
plan was also canceled due to opposition from the local council.  
The government organized the ‘Radioactive Waste Management Program 
Committee’ following an order from the prime minister and established a ‘Radioactive 
Waste Management Program Planning Team’ in conjunction with the related ministry in 
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order to select the site. A total of 10 candidates were reviewed in consideration of local 
receptivity, with the Gulup Island finally being selected. According to the ‘Act’, Gulup 
Island was assigned the status of facility site. The government held public hearings, 
project briefing sessions and open forums in order to secure this site. However, the 
objection of local people was too strong and potential faults were discovered meaning 
that the plan was immediately stopped. 
 In January 1997, the Atomic Energy Committee decided to change the managing 
department from MOST (Ministry of Science and Technology) to MOCIE (Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry and Energy), and the leading agency was altered from KAERI to 
KEPCO (Korea Electric Power Corporation.). In 2000, the government invited 
voluntarily participation and 7 sites applied for hosting facilities, with all of these sites 
eventually failing due to opposition from local government leaders.  
From 2001, the site selection process was changed as the urgency for a site grew. 
In accordance with this need, KEPCO set a plan in place to select 4 areas (Yeongdeok, 
Ulchin, Yeonggwang, Gochang) as candidates for a feasibility study and to appoint a final 
site following a geological survey and discussions with the local community during a one 
year period.   
Table 3. Candidate Sites for Radioactive waste management facility and anti-nuclear movement 
(’86~’03) 
1986~1989 Yeongdeok, Ulchin, Yeongil Anti-nuclear movement in East sea region 
1990 Anmyeon Island 
Anti-nuclear campaign on Anmyeon 
Island 
1991~1992 Cheongha All-at-onceness national anti-nuclear 
movement (‘91~’94) 1993 Jangahn, Ulchin 
1994 Gulup Island Anti-nuclear campaign on Gulup Island 
2003 Wi Island No place for Radioactive waste disposal 
(Source: A study on governance of selecting nuclear waste treatment site, 2007) 
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C. The Change of Approach for Radioactive Waste Management Facility Siting 
 Once the government of president Rho was established in February 2003 it 
announced a new process for site selection. In spite of this, local government leaders of 
representing the 4 candidate sites refused requests for a preliminary survey. With no 
resolution in sight, the local leader of Buan eventually allowed radioactive waste 
management disposal sites despite the opposition of residents in July. This induced 
immense social conflict, with residents taking part in candlelight vigils and keeping their 
children home from school. There was also armed conflict between residents and police. 
The resignation of the minister of MOCIE and the inhabitants' poll concluded this phase 
of dispute. This poll did not have any legal force, but 92% of voters – 72% of all residents 
– refused the site invitation, meaning that the government had no choice but to reject the 
application of the leader of Buan.
25
 
After 19 years of policy failure, the government redesigned the selection process. 
The government allocated disposal site one for high level and the other for low-
intermediate level radioactive waste. They also prioritized the construction of a site for 
low-intermediate level waste. At this point, a special act for the assistance of local 
government was established, and a special support fund of 300 billion was allocated for 
the initial stage of development. Moreover, the local government can receive commission 
for the movement of 1 billion won per year along with the management of  the facility. 
This included moving the head office of KHNP (Korea Hydro Nuclear Power) to the site. 
 The government established the committee for site selection to deliberate the 
process, investigate feasibility, and select the region for inhabitants’ poll. The committee 
was composed of science and technology experts, as well as politicians, management, 
social experts, journalists, lawyers and NGOs. On 16 June, the government announced 
                                           
25
 Jin-Chul Rho, “Decision in Siting Policy for Risk Facilities and Risk-Conflict-Focusing on the Selection 
of Sites for Radioactive Waste Disposal”, Korean Eco Society, Vol.6 (2004). 
 17 
 
new public contest of the site. The 4 sites – Gyeongju, Pohang, Yeongdeok, Gunsan – had 
received the consent of local government and submitted their applications. Following a 
feasibility study carried out by the committee, each site was submitted to a referendum, 
with the site that achieved the highest favorability rating being selected.  
Figure 3. Flowchart of the site selection procedure  
 (Source: Construction of Medium-low Radioactive waste treatment disposal site: Status and issues) 
 
 The government announced that the referendum would take place on 2
nd
 Nov. 
Following this announcement, each local government received the application as absentee 
voters until 8, Oct. The rates of absentee voters were relatively high, as we can see below. 
Table 4. The outcome of referendum 
 Gyeongju Gunsan Yeongdeok Pohang Total 
Total electors 208,607 196,980 37,536 374,697 817,820 
Absentees 79,599 77,581 10,319 82,637 250,136 
- Rate (%) 38.1 39.4 27.5 22.0 30.6 
Total voters 147,636 138,192 30,107 178,586 494,521 
- Absentee voters 70,521 65,336 9,523 63,851 209,231 
- Voters at booth 77,115 72,856 20,584 114,735 285,290 
Turnout (%) 70.8 70.2 80.2 47.4 60.5 
Rate of Favor (%) 89.5 84.4 79.3 67.5  
(Source: Construction of Medium-low Radioactive waste treatment disposal site: Status and issues) 
Through this process, Gyeongju was finally chosen as a radioactive waste disposal 
site in 2005. We have briefly reviewed how the progress of the site selection procedure 
from 1986 to 2005. The government tried to achieve site selection by increasing 
compensation, enhancing democratic institution such as the participation of local 
residents, and building public relationships regarding safety issues. However, prior to the 
introduction of the competitive site selection procedure, all government efforts had failed. 
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Table 5. The process of site selection 
Period Process Outcome Method 
’86-’89 
3 candidates by documentary 
survey – Ulchin, Yeongdeok, 
YeongIl 
Halt of feasibility study due 
to local disturbance 
Designation 
’90-’91 
Closed investigation on 
Anmyeon island – 
implementation as research 
center 
Cancellation due to local 
disturbance – Distrust 
regarding the disguised and 
closed process 
Designation 
’91-’93 
Contest for volunteering 
candidates & Investigation 
for candidate sites (SNU) – 
selection of 6 candidates 
(Gosung, Jangheung,.) 
Failed due to local 
disturbance 
Designation 
Contest 
’93-’94 
Proposal as local support 
project to 3 applied regions 
Failure due to local 
disturbance 
Contest 
’94-’95 
Designated notification of 
Gulup island 
Cancelation of notification 
following detection of 
capability fault 
Designation 
’00-’01 
Contest between 46 local 
governments of littoral 
districts 
Petition from 7 regions, but 
no application 
Contest 
’02-’03 
Designation of 4 candidates- 
Ulchin, Yeongdeok, Gochang, 
Yeonggwang 
Failure due to local 
disturbance 
Designation 
’03 
Contest & Feasibility study-
Gunsan, Buan, Samcheok 
(Opposition of feasibility 
study - Ulchin, Yeongdeok, 
Gochang, Yeonggwang) 
Gunsan: Detection of 
capability fault 
Samcheok: Abandonment 
Buan: Applied, but failed 
due to local disturbance 
Contest 
’04 
Introduction of bidding 
process - referendum 
Petition from 7 regions, but 
no application 
Contest 
’05 
3 Mar. 
2 Nov. 
 
Notification of a special law 
Referendum 
Decision of Gyeongju site Contest 
(Source: The impacts of information cascade on residents’ collective preference: The case of nuclear waste 
disposal facility sites) 
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D. Analysis of Changing Approach 
We have reviewed existing studies which analyze the site selection process of 
certain Korean cases. This chapter will provide a detailed examination of the reasons 
behind the success and failure of the site selection. The site selection project was 
classified from the 1
st
 project to the 7
th
 project as below: 
- 1st project (1984 ~ 1989) : Ulchin, Yeongdeok, Yeongil 
- 2nd project (1990.5 ~ 1990.11) : Anmyeon island 
- 3rd project (1991~1994) : Goseong, Yangyang, Ulchin, Yeongil, etc. 
- 4th project (1994~1995.11) : Gulup island 
- 5th project (1996~2001.7): the whole country 
- 6th project(2002~2004): Wi island at Buan district 
- 7th project (2004.2~11): the success of site selection at Gyeongju 
 
The change of compensation 
The government can provide compensation for inducing local people’s 
acceptance of danger if it emerges that the proposed facility has a potential negative effect. 
In fact, as local demonstrations grow in intensity, a drastic increase of compensation to 
local residents can be judged as a policy modification in order to obtain policy receptivity 
by offsetting the negative awareness of site selection.
26
 
Compensation to local residents from the national government has risen 
dramatically as shown by Table 6. In addition to the special fund, additional benefits also 
exists such as the movement of a proton accelerator which can lead to regional 
development in the future, and the relocation of KHNP (Korea Hydro and Nuclear 
                                           
26 JuYong Jung, “Radical Change of Policy Acceptance – a case study on the location policy of radioactive 
waste disposal facilities in Korea”, Korea University (2008). 
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Power)’s head office as well as the support of other ministries’ local projects. However, 
despite this policy modification, the resistance of local residents has become increasingly 
difficult to cope with, specifically with regards to the 6
th
 site selection procedure. 
 
Table 6. Changes of compensation 
 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th  
Special 
Fund 
(KRW) 
- - - 50bil. 125bil. 300bil. 300bil. 
Additional 
Benefit 
- - 
Support of 
desired 
local project 
Support of 
desired 
local 
project 
Support of 
desired 
local 
project 
Moving of 
Proton 
Accelerator/  
Head Office 
Moving of 
Proton 
Accelerator/  
Head Office 
Remarks 
 
 
90bil. 
to local 
govern. 
 
 
50bil. to 
welfare 
foundation 
 
 
Local 
developmen
t project 
Local 
development 
project 
(Source: Radical Change of Policy Acceptance – a case study on the location policy of radioactive waste 
disposal facilities in Korea, 2008) 
 
 
Figure 4. Changes in amount of special fund (Billion KRW) 
 
 This initial failure made the national government realize the importance of 
compensation. The government suggested that a 90 billion KRW special fund be provided 
0 
50 
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1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
Fund(Bil.) 
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for local development and that land compensation should be paid for the purchase of site 
at the 2
nd
 site selection project on Anmyeon island. This economic compensation 
positively affected the enhancement of policy receptivity, as land owners quickly agreed 
to this site selection. 
 However, the radical local demonstrations were far more severe than the 1
st
 site 
selection project, and thus the 2nd site selection was canceled. The reason behind this was 
that the government expected to ensure policy receptivity by placing emphasis on 
compensation only, despite the fact that previous analysis at the 1st site explained that the 
reasons for failure were based on various causes such as closed procedures by peremptory 
government, distrust and anxiety regarding insufficient information. This demonstrated 
the impatience of the government, which chose a methodological approach to induce 
policy receptivity. The situation became more serious when anti-nuclear groups bonded 
with local residents.  
 The government announced a plan which supported the long-cherished local 
project of the radioactive waste management site through a nation-wide presentation. The 
purpose of this presentation was to enhance public awareness of governmental 
compensation, and to be done with the closed approach which had been used in the past. 
Accordingly, 44 regions declared their interest at the initial stage of the 3
rd
 project, thus it 
seems that compensation led to the enhancement of policy receptivity. However, the 
resistance of anti-nuclear civic organizations and local residents began when the 
government announced 6 candidates for the site.  
 The response of the government to this resistance was to place more emphasis on 
compensation. The government established the ‘Promotion of radioactive waste 
management facility and support for periphery areas Act’. This was designed to appease 
local residents who were opposed to the site. The government did not recognize that the 
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aggressive activity of anti-nuclear civic groups had led to a sudden spread of opposite 
opinion. The governmental approach, which had obviously not taken on board lessons 
from past failures, ironically stiffened the logic of anti-nuclear civic groups ironically – 
‘The government press local people to bear the risk.’  
 The government consistently placed emphasis on compensation at the 4
th
 site 
selection project in 1994. The government expected local people to react positively to 
compensation once a regional representative agency had been established on the act. In 
fact, the ‘Committee for development and welfare of Deokjeok’ was established, and the 
government provided 50 billion KRW as the fund for regional development. However, 
residents in Ongjin-gun and Incheon city together with the anti-nuclear civic groups 
resisted, and the demonstration intensified due to the opinion that the site was not 
scientifically feasible. The government overlooked a technological review on the safety of 
the site, since they were convinced of the success of the site and encouraged the 
institutional framework of economic compensation. 
 The compensation for the 5
th
 site project was dramatically increased in 1996. 
KEPCO (Korea Electric Power Corporation) were then put in sole charge of the site 
selection, and raised the atomic energy development fund by setting 1.2KRW/1kw and 
promising to support local government with 260~300 billion KRW. The target of 
compensation was then expanded to the periphery area and local governments’ 
jurisdiction. However, the 5
th
 site selection project failed in spite of this dramatic 
expansion of compensation. The procedure of site selection included the agreement of 
local assembly, and reinforced the political pressure of anti-nuclear civic groups. Anti-
nuclear civic groups had begun to exercise political leverage since the Gulup island case, 
but the government underestimated their capacity as a political force.  
 At the 6
th
 site selection project on April 2003, the government announced that it 
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was increasing the special fund to 300 billion KRW. The promotion of a proton 
accelerator which was created added 460 billion KRW to the movement of KHNP’s head 
office and supported the local project of 10 ministries. Nevertheless, this compensation 
did not result in policy receptivity. The procedure started with the application of local 
residents, and was passed through local assembly, before finally a local government head 
submitted it to the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy. The site was designated 
by the government, thus the agreement of local assembly was able to directly connect to 
the site selection. As a result of this, the local assembly was reluctant to express their 
opinion.  
 The governor of Buan decided to submit the application for economic application 
on his own for economic compensation, which led to severe resistance from local people. 
In addition, the government approved this submission and pushed ahead the site selection. 
The opposition movement was intensified by the participation of anti-nuclear civic groups 
and religious leaders. The negative image of the site and distrust toward the government 
was strengthened, and thus 91.6% of voters in Buan opposed the site selection. 
 The amount of the economic compensation for the 6
th
 and the 7
th
 projects was 
almost identical. The only difference concerned new legislation, specifically a special Act 
regarding the management of medium-low level radioactive waste; a revelation which 
rallied support and trust among local residents toward the policy and the government. 
Accordingly, the compensation seemed to relieve any anxiety felt by local residents and 
helped local residents to recognize the advantages of local economic development. With 
this said, it is too early to conclude that the main factor in policy receptivity was 
economic compensation.
27
 
 
                                           
27 Ju-Yong Jung, “Radical Change of Policy Acceptance – a case study on the location policy of radioactive 
waste disposal facilities in Korea”, Korea University (2008) : 132. 
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Diversification of deliberation structure 
 Groupthink causes errors in group decision making. It refers to the tendency for 
premature and extreme concurrence seeking among group members. It has been identified 
as one of the causes of major fiascoes, large planning projects and strategic 
management.
28
 With this in mind, we should accept criticism from various parties 
regarding policy errors. To permit criticism would be helpful with regards finding errors 
in the past and rapidly exploring appropriate alternatives.
29
 
 The government accepted criticism regarding the involvement of various 
stakeholders in the process of enforcement and decision making to explore new 
alternatives and correct errors. This was because the government recognized the 
limitations of exploring various policy alternatives through a dedicated task force for the 
site selection. Moreover, the government attempted to prevent conflict factors in advance 
by taking on board the opinions of anti-nuclear groups. When looking at Table 7 below, 
we can see an improvement with regards to institutional concreteness as time goes by.  
 
 
Table 7. Change of deliberation structure 
 
 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th 5th  6th  7th  
Site 
selection 
Ministry 
Ministry, 
Local 
govern. 
Ministry, 
Local 
govern., 
Related 
organ., 
Experts 
Ministry 
Local 
govern., 
(Pan 
Govern.) 
Ministry 
Local 
govern., 
(Pan 
Govern.) 
Ministry 
Local 
govern., 
(Pan 
Govern.) 
Ministry 
Local 
govern., 
(Pan 
Govern.) 
Draw 
candidates  
Agency Agency 
Agency, 
Related 
Govern. 
Agency, 
Related 
Govern. 
MOCIE 
KHNP 
KONEPA 
Agency, 
Related 
Govern. 
Related 
Govern. 
Local 
Govern. 
                                           
28 Paul Hart, Groupthink in government: A study of small groups and policy failure. Lisse, Netherlands: 
Swets & Zeitlinger Publishers (1990) : 2. 
29 Yeong-pyeong Kim, Uncertaintiy and Legitimacy of the policy, Korea University Press (1991). 
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Selecting 
candidates 
- - 
Local 
Govern. 
Citizen 
Local 
Govern. 
Citizen 
Local 
Govern./ 
Assembly 
Citizen 
Local 
Govern./ 
Assembly 
Citizen 
Local 
Govern./ 
Assembly 
Citizen 
Institutional 
support  
 
 
Establish 
Promotion 
Act 
 
 
Revision of 
PeripheryAct 
Revision 
of Atomic 
Act 
Establish 
waste 
management 
Act 
(Source: Radical Change of Policy Acceptance – a case study on the location policy of radioactive waste 
disposal facilities in Korea, 2008) 
 
 The concreteness of the laws and institutions tended to be strengthened as 
deliberation structure was expanded. The collapse of site selection made pan-
governmental cooperation necessary in order to meet the requirements of local residents 
and anti-nuclear NGOs. Therefore, modification of the laws and institutions became 
easier than before. However, the claim that the diversification of deliberation structure 
improved policy acceptance does not seem very convincing. The demonstration of local 
residents became more violent until the 6
th
 site selection project, meaning that the site 
selection was continuously defeated. Methods for enhancing public acceptance level – 
that is, trust in decision making procedures, trust in institutions, and unfairness of 
allocated benefits and costs – are not directly applicable to Korean cases in the same 
context.
30
 
 
Enlargement of local people participation 
 Public participation in the site selection procedure may delete the avoidance 
factor and increase endurance factors by improving procedural fairness and the possibility 
of self-control. It seems natural that people hope to participate in the decision making 
procedure when the decisions and policy implementation affect their interests. The 
                                           
30 Ju-Yong Jung, “Radical Change of Policy Acceptance – a case study on the location policy of radioactive 
waste disposal facilities in Korea”, Korea University (2008) : 138. 
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government attempted to expand public participation in order to secure public acceptance 
as shown in Table 8.
31
  
Table 8. Change of public participation 
 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th 5th  6th  7th  
Selection 
Method 
Driven 
by 
Govern
ment 
Driven 
by 
Govern
ment 
Public 
Contest / 
Driven by 
Government 
Public 
Contest / 
Driven by 
Government 
Provider 
Driven 
Contest 
Provider 
Driven 
Contest 
Public 
Contest / 
Referendum 
Participation - 
Local 
Govern
ment 
Local 
Citizen 
Local 
Citizen 
 
Local 
Government 
/ Assembly/ 
Citizen 
Local 
Government 
/ Assembly/ 
Citizen 
Local 
Government 
/ Assembly / 
Citizen 
Participation 
Method 
- - 
Application 
of Local 
Society / 
Government 
Designation 
Application 
of Local 
Society / 
Government 
Designation 
Application 
of Local 
Society 
/Assembly 
Agreement / 
Government 
Designation 
Application 
of Local 
Society / 
Assembly 
Agreement / 
Government 
Designation 
Application 
of Local 
Society / 
Assembly 
Agreement / 
Open 
Competition 
(Source: Radical Change of Policy Acceptance – a case study on the location policy of radioactive waste 
disposal facilities in Korea, 2008) 
 
 The public participation level was determined according to the site selection 
method of the government. The first project was implemented using a government-led 
procedure, meaning that the participation of local residents was alienated. Indeed, this 
closed procedure was one of the causes of this opposition. The claim that the resistance of 
residents stemmed from a lack of participation in the government’s closed decision 
making processes seems to be persuasive.  
 This logic could be applied to the 2
nd
 site selection project. The government 
carried out prior consultation with the Chungcheongnamdo (local government), but this 
was in fact a kind of strategy through which to avoid public participation. Local residents 
                                           
31 Ibid., : 133 
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on Anmyon island heavily criticized the government's behavior, and opposed it with anti-
nuclear NGOs.
32
 
 The government adopted a contest site approach in order to enlarge public 
participation from the 3
rd
 site selection project following the Anmyon island crisis. This 
contest site approach meant that the government selected the most feasible site as a final 
candidate among applications of local residents. It seemed as though the government  
expected higher public acceptance through the contest since economic incentive was 
determined. However, the backlash from local residents continued contrary to the 
government's expectations. It was impossible to eradicate all the causes of opposition. 
Indeed, the contest approach may only have reflected the will of a certain number of 
residents only, rather than the will of all the residents. In addition, the final candidate was 
designated by government only, meaning that most of the local residents who did not 
participate in the decision making process and anti-nuclear NGOs could join easily.  
 The government announced 5 principles of the site selection – Openness, Clarity, 
Reliability, Efficiency and Independence – to encourage the substantial participation of 
local residents. The government added one more method and gave residents the power to 
select the local project which they felt should be supported by the government. 
Participants selected this project during the application procedure. Despite this 
participation method change, there was more radical resistance on Gulup island, with the 
anti-nuclear civil groups becoming more organized. The participation of residents had its 
limitations in terms of the fact that the government selected Gulup island as the final 
candidate. Distrust felt by residents increased as an active fault was found on Gulup 
island.  
 KEPCO, the new stakeholder responsible for site selection, recognized that the 
                                           
32 Kyongdong Kim, Dooseung Hong, Nuclear and Regional Society, Seoul National University Press 
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opinions of a portion of residents could not ensure procedural justice, and thus 
implemented a new contest method – application from the head of local government in 
the base of local assembly’s agreement. However, anti-nuclear civic groups placed 
political pressure on local Councils and government, which resulted in the failure of site 
selection. Environmental organizations defeated many movements made by local 
politicians regarding various environmental issues at that time, and the radioactive waste 
management site selection was no exception. 
 The government failed to provide any differentiated public participation policy 
for the 6
th
 site selection project, meaning that they had to propose significant additional 
incentives and to expect agreement from local residents. However, the participation 
method of the 5
th
 and 6
th
 project could not eliminate the political pressure of anti-nuclear 
NGOs, because most local politicians were interested in their re-election, and as such, 
watched residents’ reactions carefully. In addition, public participation was enlarged as 
the referendum was introduced, but the single application of a local governor at Buan 
seemed to lack procedural legitimacy. Indeed, resistance was still intense and it was 
difficult to expect rational and objective judgments from local residents.  
 The government site selection procedures had failed despite the continuous 
expansion of public participation. Public participation was one of the reasons behind 
enhanced public acceptance level, but it is difficult to find causal relations with 
procedural legitimacy. Meanwhile, there was a referendum at the 7
th
 site selection project, 
the result of which was significantly different. Four local councils resolved the site 
selection agreement, and the resistance movement turned into the approval movement. A 
new rule was put into play – a competitive site selection.33 
  
                                           
33 Ju-Yong Jung, “Radical Change of Policy Acceptance – a case study on the location policy of radioactive 
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Main reasons of siting failure 
 Almost all of the policy corrections which the government attempted throughout 
the site selection procedure seemed to focus on the elimination of resistance. The 
government attempted to cover up local resistance by increasing compensation, enlarging 
public participation and diversifying deliberation structures in order to ascertain the main 
causes of this resistance.
34
  
 These efforts certainly contributed to an improvement in public acceptance level. 
If there was no compensation for locally unwanted land uses or decision making in an 
undemocratic way, it was natural to struggle with radical resistance. However, the crucial 
point was that the government focused more on adopting new artificial methods for 
covering the resistance of local residents than they did on recognizing casual texture in 
order to handle artificial causes and situational condition together. The possibility of 
repeated failure would only arise if methods for raising public acceptance level failed to 
recognize causal texture. Indeed when this was recognized it caused the government to 
adopt an experimental alternative policy.
35
 For example, with the 3
rd
 site selection project, 
the government attempted to implement the site selection procedure in island areas to 
avoid regional resistance despite the fact there had been more radical resistance 
movement of residents and anti-nuclear groups at the 2
nd
 site selection project. Indeed, 
this can be viewed as a typical policy correction failure. 
 An alternative policy for ensuring public acceptance was not limited by the 
relationship with government and local residents. It involved a complex structure of 
various causes – political situations, economic situations, social issues and activities of 
stakeholders who affect recognition of local residents, and so on. However, the 
government did not focus on this kind of complexity.  
                                           
34
 Ibid. 138. 
35 Yeong-pyeong Kim, Uncertaintiy and Legitimacy of the policy, Korea University Press (1991). 
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 One of the main problems in the study of organizational change has to do with 
the fact that the environmental contexts in which organizations exist are themselves 
changing at an increasing rate, under the impact of technological change. This means that 
they demand consideration for their own sake. Towards this end a redefinition is offered, 
at a social level of analysis, regarding the causal texture of the environment.
36
  
 It seems impossible to consider all kinds of causal texture and to recognize the 
causal structure of public acceptance. Moreover, we cannot be sure that the new 
alternative policy would achieve the intended interactions, when we can recognize the 
causal structure perfectly. The interaction among various textures, timings and 
stakeholders can generate chaos and disorder, whilst also rendering policy alternatives 
useless. Therefore, it could be said that every policy decision returns to the problem of 
uncertainty, and accompanies policy errors.
37
 The government must identify all possible 
causes which affect public acceptance, and attempt to recognize causal structure.   
Key features of changing public receptivity  
 The correction of policy failure did not yield only negative results. The 
democratic procedure was improved by including the agreement of local council, which 
reduced the distrust of local residents. People began to take an interest in site hosting due 
to increased compensation, and continuous public relations which reduced negative 
opinion regarding radioactive waste management facilities. In other words, the 
government can identify the demand of local residents through several failed cases and 
error correction. With this in mind, the foundation for rapid change of public acceptance 
could be prepared. If the government were to implement site selection in a closed process 
or did not provide proper compensation for acceptance of risk, public acceptance level 
                                           
36 F. E. Emery, E. L. Trist, “The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments”, ORGANIZATION 
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could simply not be high. Thus, the policy correction aimed at fulfilling residents’ 
demands was necessary in order to achieve a rapid change in public acceptance. 
 The new rule of game - competitive hosting through the referendum - made 
candidates gather information on competitors, revise their own strategy for agreement, 
and explore new strategies. In conclusion, public opinion tilted to host the site. The 
purpose of the four competitors was to achieve the 1st prize only, as the 2nd prize meant 
defeat. Therefore, blocking opposition was strengthened and emphasis was placed on the 
agreement of public opinion. All candidates limited anti-nuclear NGO activity, and 
emphasized that there would be no repeat of the ‘Buan case.’ Supporters submitted the 
application of meeting in advance in order to block opposition campaigns and to criticize 
the anti-nuclear civic groups. Indeed, the activities of opposition groups were decreased 
and abandoned. Radical change of public acceptance is only possible when conditions are 
present which can rally more support than opposition and achieve continuous positive 
interaction.
38
  
 
 Figure 5. The result of referendum after the competition  
                                           
38 Ju-Yong Jung, “Radical Change of Policy Acceptance – a case study on the location policy of radioactive 
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E. Remained Conflicts  
Despite the eventual success of the site selection, there remained challenges with 
regards to managing the facility in a sustainable manner. There remained an anti-nuclear 
movement, as well as demonstrations and on-going conflicts. To resolve the 
communication problem of social conflict, the deliberate democracy was accepted as a 
new paradigm in the most useful way. However, we can see that the democratic system 
and policy led to a paradoxical result. The government introduced an innovative 
framework as governance is the base of transparency and participation. However, this was 
transferred to the local elite alliance. The referendum became a measure of political 
legitimacy, and some criticized this referendum for being an unfair game without a judge. 
There were many problems pertaining to the poll – preliminary poll movement by the 
local government, falsifying of absentee ballot, open ballot, proxy voting, provision of 
money and values, and instigating regionalism.
39
 Therefore, the question arises, how will 
the site selection be evaluated? Is it the splendid achievement of deliberative democracy 
as the government insisted? Or, is it a plausible story of an unfair game as stated by anti 
nuclearists ? Moreover, if the referendum was taken with justice, are there no matter? 
Similar to the perspective of democracy, the referendum is meaningful when 
there is enough information regarding the issue and sharing opinions. This referendum 
premised competition among other local governments, and stimulated the encouragement 
of regionalism. In this situation, can the social consensus be evaluated as part of a 
democratic procedure? After the initial survey, each local politician employed a different 
approach in their region. In the case of Gyeong ju, the local government promoted 
actively using mass media and the press, whilst a promotional organization attempted to 
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persuade residents one to one.
40
 At the first poll, the rate of voting in favor was 66.2% in 
Gyeongju, 62.1% in Gunsan, and 59% in Yeongdeok. After fierce competition for 
inducement, the rate became 89.5% in Gyeongju, 84.4% in Gunsan, 79.3% and in 
Yeongdeok. In Gunsan, acts of violence were carried out by residents and organizations to 
oppose this move (KukminIlbo, 2005).  
 
 
IV. A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON PERIODIC CHANGE OF SITING 
APPROACH FOR RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITY 
 
 The time required to construct a repository, emplace waste, and to seal and close 
the repository is at least 50 years. Indeed this is according to the most optimistic plans 
which have been put forth for the U.S. and other national programs. Some national 
programs envision a period of at least a century before accomplishing the geological 
disposition of high-level radioactive waste (HLW). Leaders in the governments of 
democratic societies have to deal with many controversial issues whereby local and 
provincial interests and attitudes must be balanced against national goals. One can 
observe in many areas of the world strong conflicts among nations and ethnic groups, 
whose roots in public attitudes go back many centuries. Progress in resolving these 
conflicts has often required arduous negotiation, innovative leadership from within each 
of the parties and from outside mediators, and patient efforts to make progress in small 
steps.  
 Similar processes may be needed in the nuclear waste context regarding the 
related concerns of dread, distrust, and concerns about inequities. Progress will not come 
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over night, and continued controversy, criticism, and dissent should be expected. There 
have not been many policy problems which require a half-century deliberation process. 
Knowledge is now accumulating on new methods by which to achieve public decisions.
41
 
During the coming years, there will be a significant, ongoing challenge with regards to 
alleviating pressures on waste managers to revert to a very short decision and evaluation 
cycle. The change of approach regarding site selection has shown characteristic aspects, 
depending on the culture and history of each country. This study roughly categorizes 
these characteristic aspects of site selection. 
 
A. One way decision by Government (1960~1970) 
 Countries who built radioactive waste management facilities in the 1960s took 
the position of the government driven process. In fact, it was the most common way to 
select the site at that time. The concept of ‘citizen participation’ and ‘anti nuclear 
movement’ had not yet emerged, meaning that the radioactive waste management facility 
could be built without serious opposition and resistance.
42
 
 In the case of France, all siting decisions were made by the government based on 
technical judgments regarding the merits of the site, and did not involve much 
participation from the public nor local officials prior to 1990. Four sites were selected in 
this way and geological surveys at various levels were conducted. However, the 
implementer, ANDRA, experienced local opposition, and in some cases, violent 
demonstrations occurred. This led the French government, in 1989, to declare a 
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moratorium on all site investigations.
43
 The La Manche radioactive waste management 
facility of France was built in 1969. There was no specific conflict between local 
residents and the government as there was little inception on the radioactive waste 
management facility. However, the side effects from this simple site selection have 
emerged with the passage of time. Indeed, contaminated material from the corrosion of 
metal drums leaked into underground water due to lax management. Following this, the 
French government addressed this problem with engineering and technology, whilst an 
investigation was also carried out and monitoring was coordinated with local residents. 
According to this process, most local residents are trusting regarding the ‘safety issue.’ 
However, there remained a burden - the doubtful attention of other regions on the 
agricultural and marine products of this region.
44
 
 
B. Decide-Announce-Defend Method (1970~2000) 
 The detail format has been changed with the passing of time. Indeed, the DAD 
(Decide-Announce-Defend) method has been most commonly used to establish and 
operate the policy of the radioactive waste management system. First of all, this method 
involves the selection of a site based on technological analysis to fulfill the needs of the 
facility. Throughout the selection process, there are no discussions with other 
stakeholders (or interest groups) who expect a different decision. Following this, a 
government announces the established policy to its citizens. However, most of the citizen 
oppose and resist the policy announcement, as previously summarized. Therefore, the 
government creates many options to defend their choice against citizens’ opposition. 
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Armour explained that governments choose a DAD method, because they regard the 
decision of sites like radioactive waste management facilities as an inherent right of them. 
However, as the society becomes diversified, the unilateral decisions of governments 
arouse a strong opposition from related stakeholders and local residents. Consequently, 
the expected efficient policy implementation cannot be achieved, and the policy itself is 
abandoned.  
 The case of the UK demonstrates the main problem encountered when siting 
excludes the participation of local residents and transparency. In the early 1990s, NIREX, 
the organization in charge of managing radioactive waste, selected a site near Sellafield 
based on multi-attribute utility analysis. NIREX requested approval for a research facility 
which would investigate underground rock, but Cumbria, the local government rejected 
the approval. NIREX appealed, before responsibility for the decision was handed to the 
minister of the Ministry of Environment following a long confirmation hearing. The 
hearing investigator submitted a guideline of rejection to the approval to the minister of 
Ministry of Environment. In conclusion, NIREX decided to give up the site of Sellafiled 
in 1997.  
 The reasons for the approval rejection involved a long history of lack of 
transparency regarding the NIREX research for a site selection. NIREX did not propose 
any other alternative candidate sites, and insisted that discussions regarding the local 
effect of a radioactive waste management facility should be delayed until after the 
feasibility study of the site. These kinds of attitudes would certainly not gain the trust of 
local residents. NIREX has enhanced transparency and created improvements such as the 
recent operation of public hearings, although they have been unable to recover the trust of 
local residents.
45
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 In France, site-screening criteria prior to 1991 covered purely geologic safety 
aspects as previously mentioned. The French government requested a future direction for 
siting to OPECST, the parliament's science evaluation office, after the announcement of 
Moratorium on every feasibility study before 1989. The public hearing was led by 
Christian Bataille, as a member of the National Assembly went through the pass of 
‘Waste Act’ in 1991. According to this, France decided to search for a site, research the 
waste treatment process and investigate other site options.
46
 
 
C. Joint Research and Mutual Agreement (1990~) 
New approaches to managing environmental conflicts, particularly environmental 
negotiation and mediation, have been increasingly employed since the early 1970s in 
order to help resolve some of these disputes. These processes are new to citizen groups, 
and differ from the established strategies and tools. The techniques include collaboration 
among contending interest groups instead of adversarial relationships; they involve 
consensus decision-making rather than judgments by authorities. Consequently, dispute 
resolution processes require new, and different skills as well as perspectives on the part of 
citizens.
47
 
 In France and the UK, earlier negative experiences regarding site selection have 
led to the re-evaluation and redirection of the overall national programs. In France a 
period of successive crises meant that, in 1991, a law was put in place which instituted a 
new approach to waste management in general, and site selection in particular, with 
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responsibility, transparency and democracy as lead principles.
48
 This law specified that 
work would continue in parallel on a 15-year time scale on developing repository projects, 
studying waste treatment (including partitioning and transmutation), and further clarifying 
the issues associated with surface storage.
49
 
  The new approach to site selection seeks consensus with, and actively involves, 
responsible territorial communities. The Law institutes a local information and 
monitoring committee on each underground laboratory site. A mediation mission by Mr. 
Christian Bataille, Member of Parliament, led to the appointment of one site for an 
underground laboratory – with a second site still being sought.50  
 In 1994 with the agreement of the local communities, the mediator proposed 4 
sites, out of an initial potential list of 30 sites, to the government. These sites were: La 
Chapelle-Baton, situated in the Vienne Département, in a granite formation overlain by a 
thick sedimentary cover; Marcoule, in the Gard Département, in a thick clay formation; 
and two sites subsequently merged into a single Eastern site at the boundary between the 
Départments of Meuse and Haute-Marne. This site, also in clay, was acceptable to both 
adjacent communities. 
 The geological reconnaissance programs went smoothly, and in 1996 ANDRA 
prepared three EIAs which were submitted to the local communities through an 
interactive public enquiry, as well as to the local assemblies, to several review bodies 
(including the Commission Nationale d'Evaluation, created by the Waste Act), and to the 
government. In France, local authorities do not have power of veto. The final decision 
came on December 8, 1998, when the government decided to go ahead with the sinking 
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of a shaft and the building of an underground research laboratory at one of the three sites 
(the Eastern site, at the village of Bure), and to drop the two other sites. Work is now in 
progress at the Eastern site where, by February 2001, the shaft had reached a depth of 50 
meters. The Marcoule site was abandoned because of local opposition, essentially from 
the wine growers, who argued that the siting of a waste facility would jeopardize the 
image of the local wine, Côtes du Rhône, independent of whether the site was shown to 
be safe or not. The La Chapelle-Baton site was abandoned, not because of local 
opposition (on the contrary, local support existed at this site), but essentially because the 
Commission Nationale d'Evaluation expressed a number of scientific reservations about 
the intrinsic quality of the site.  
 The government also decided that a new site in a granite formation was to be 
selected. The 1991 Waste Act specifies that at least two sites must be examined prior to 
2006. At that time, the parliament will examine the outcome of the research program 
pursued from 1991 to 2006 on the geologic disposal option, and also on the separation-
transmutation option and the surface storage option. 
 Accordingly, the French Geological Survey and ANDRA carried out a survey of 
potential granitic sites in France, starting with existing literature and data without any 
local field work. From an initial list of approximately 200 potential sites, using various 
geologic criteria, the list was shortened to 15 new sites, distributed mostly over two areas, 
Brittany and Central France. This list was handed over to the government in October 
1999 but was not released to the public. Rather than using a member of parliament to seek 
approval from potential local communities, the government appointed three high-ranking 
civil servants, none of whom had any prior links with the nuclear establishment, to 
conduct local discussions in some of the 15 selected areas. These officials prepared 
informative documents to be presented in the local communities. The official visits to the 
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15 sites and their local communities were set to commence when, in January 2000, the 
map showing all 15 sites was leaked and posted on the Internet by an opposing non-
governmental organization. The result was that all 15 selected sites were antagonized 
upon the discovery that they had been selected without knowing about it. Following this, 
any subsequent discussions proved very difficult for the three officials. They encountered 
strong local opposition and demonstrations, some of which were violent. The government 
decided to stop the process, and none of the proposed 15 sites were selected. At present, it 
is unknown what the next move will be, since a second site must be identified if the terms 
of the 1991 law are to be fulfilled.
51
  
 In the UK, the refusal of the Nirex Rock Characterization Facility at Sellafield in 
1997 led to a complete reappraisal of radioactive waste management policy. A 
Parliamentary enquiry in 1999 recommended that the government go ahead with 
underground disposal but that its policy must be comprehensive and must have public 
support. The government replied that it would seek public views but that it would look at 
all waste management options before endorsing one particular plan. After consultation, 
Ministers announced the creation in 2003 of a new independent body to oversee the 
review and to recommend the best option, or a combination of options if necessary.  
 The events of 1997 also led Nirex to adopt a new Transparency Policy (1999) 
with a dialogue on the future long-term management of wastes. A number of dialogue 
processes are now being tested and used. Although it is too early to evaluate, the new 
approach has received initial positive response. In Spain, a delay in the program allowed 
for a strengthened educational program, which met with a very favorable response.
52
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Sweden is the representative country which tried to solve the conflict on nuclear 
issues since the initial stage. The radioactive waste management facility of Sweden was 
built on the trust of citizens. In Sweden, local communities have veto power over 
decisions affecting local planning in general, and particularly facilities which have the 
potential to affect the environment. Situations are also foreseen in which the government 
can overrule the local veto on grounds of national interest. Facilities for radioactive waste 
disposal are mentioned in this context, and the circumstances under which the 
government would use this power have been rigorously debated. On the basis of 
interaction with various segments of the public in the early feasibility studies for siting, 
the Swedish implementing organization, SKB, has clearly stated that it will conduct 
investigations and build a repository only in a community where there is local acceptance 
or tolerance for it, thereby respecting the spirit of the community’s veto power. Local 
officials and members of the public have taken an increasingly active role in evaluating 
program plans and setting conditions. In addition, Sweden has set forth specific plans for 
a phased implementation procedure, with part of the repository being backfilled, sealed, 
and monitored for decades before completing the rest. 
 The Oskarshamn experience in Sweden demonstrates how an EIA process can be 
carried out as a fruitful and effective exchange by all parties in understanding the risks to 
the public posed by a nuclear waste storage facility. Elected representatives of the 
community were extremely active in developing the technical competence to evaluate 
program proposals and in ensuring that the implementer would be informed of local 
views and needs. When Oskarshamn (already a nuclear site) was named as the preferred 
site for a HLW encapsulation plant by SKB in 1992, the municipality announced two 
main prerequisites. First, municipal participation in discussions and investigations was to 
be paid for by the Nuclear Waste Fund; second, the primary concerned parties (SKB and 
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the licensing authorities SKI [Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate] and SSI [National 
Institute of Radiation Protection]) would accept the formation of a forum for 
environmental impact assessment. A local “reference group” is a standard feature in large 
or controversial Swedish siting discussions.  
 As competence to evaluate the program was built up through six multipartite 
working groups which have remained active, the implementer's competence itself was 
“stretched” to respond in a satisfactory way to the questions posed by the community. 
This non-adversarial but determined dynamic, led by elected officials, is considered by 
the partners involved as contributing directly to a more robust set of management options, 
and a more tightly knit and informed community. This strong public involvement assures 
that a final consent or veto decision will be made on adequate grounds.
53 
  
 Canada’s siting efforts for a low-level waste (LLW) facility in the Canadian 
province of Ontario were based on “voluntary participation of local communities in a 
collaborative, joint decision-making manner” (MEMR, 1990) including “structural and 
process guarantees that local participation [was] and remain[ed] voluntary.” 54  The 
process came close to completion but was ultimately unsuccessful, in part due to 
“uncertainty about government resolve to continue the process as designed.”55 For 
example, the federal government refused to accept the community agreement in principle 
negotiated by a task force and the community.
56
 Comparative evaluations of a number of 
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such efforts involving both LLW and hazardous waste indicated that it is “very difficult 
for large bureaucracies to surmount internal constraints and technically oriented norms 
and goals to meet requirements (of voluntary siting programs) for responsiveness and 
adequate implementation.”57 
 Between 1990 and 1993, the Belgian government agency responsible for waste 
management in Belgium, ONDRAF/NIRAS, conducted a survey of the Belgian territory 
to identify zones where a near-surface repository for low-level short lived wastes might 
possibly be installed. The survey was based on technical and scientific criteria, of which 
the most important was geologically favorable conditions. In total, 98 such zones were 
identified, and the results were made available in a report. However, that report was 
rejected unanimously by all municipalities concerned. Given the deadlock, the 
government decided that further studies should concentrate on the existing nuclear zones: 
power reactors, fuel cycle industries, and major research facilities. 
 ONDRAF/NIRAS opted for a new approach which would involve local 
authorities, two universities, and local populations in the site selection and planning of 
such a repository through the creation of local partnerships. Two such partnerships are 
already operational for the Mol-Dessel zone to consider technical, safety-related, social, 
economic, and environmental aspects. The final assessment and responsibility, primarily 
for aspects related to long-term safety, are the exclusive prerogative of ONDRAF/NIRAS. 
The conclusions of this exercise should be available no later than 2002.
58
 
 Of all countries, Finland has probably had the most success in moving toward 
siting a deep repository with maximum community involvement and public confidence. 
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From studies at a number of potential sites, the choice was narrowed to two sites which 
already have nuclear facilities, with an emphasis on demonstrating that the geological 
conditions at these sites were no less suitable than at others. The EIA process was seized 
on as a means for in depth consideration of public concerns and needs. Thereafter, 
competition even broke out between the two communities seeking to host the Finnish 
spent fuel repository. The balance achieved in Finland between geological and societal 
criteria for site choice certainly warrants further study.
59
 
 
D. Lesson Learned from other countries - To Improve Citizen Participation 
 Strategies of partnership, power sharing, collaboration, and negotiation allow a 
host community to proceed with a siting process which relies less on trust in some 
external authority rather than on the host community's own capabilities and evaluation.  
 Specific mechanisms which may be helpful in such an approach include the 
following: 
 • Community participation in all phases of the siting process; 
 • Support for independent consultants; 
 • Community review of facility design and safety systems; 
 • Monitoring of facility performance; 
 • Property value protection; and 
 • The right to initiate appeals for facility shutdown if health and safety standards 
are violated. 
 Such actions to empower local communities in both siting and facility 
development may be the key to improved siting success. Different means may be used to 
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develop these recommended features. The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirement has been used, particularly in Scandinavia, as an opportunity to conduct 
social impact assessment. The EIA process therefore becomes a means by which extra-
technical aspects of risk can be discussed, documented, and taken into account.
60
 The 
five country examples which follow, showing the experience of different countries with 
siting, may be useful as illustrations.
61
 
 The political leaderships of various nations have reformulated nuclear waste 
programs in order to emphasize the need for societal choice. Concerted efforts are being 
made to design, adapt, test, and carry out new procedures for, and approaches to, decision 
making. Two broad types of shift are particularly apparent.  
 The first type of shift seen today in many countries concerns the consideration 
given to needs, concerns, views, and judgments which lie outside the central waste 
management system. Examples include the following:  
 Collaborative research with volunteer communities to obtain equitable 
implementation. For instance, a “volunteer principle,” in which one begins the siting 
process by eliciting expressions of interest from communities over a wide region or in the 
entire country, has been attempted in France, Sweden, Finland, Canada, and other 
countries.
62
 The widespread adoption and elaboration of the concept of reversibility, 
often absent from early program concepts and introduced by public demand. Examples of 
this include the European Union's concerted action program, CNE (National Commission 
for Evaluation) in France, and KASAM (National Council for Nuclear Waste) in Sweden 
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which have collected input on reversibility. Sweden has pushed the concept of 
reversibility to the point of submitting the entire repository to a pilot evaluation period.  
 The second type of shift involves clarification of institutional identity and the 
relative roles of stakeholders. Examples are the following:  
 The sharing of decision power among nuclear authorities and national and local 
representations. For instance, France shifted emphasis from evaluating designated sites 
for repository suitability, to creating a “responsible, democratic, transparent” management 
process and placing HLW management choices in the hands of parliament (the 1991 
Waste Act). Finland will also seek parliamentary approval for a design concept and 
submit this concept to local examination. In Sweden, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and 
Waste Management Company (SKB) has promised to make site investigations only in 
communities where such investigations are accepted.  
 The remodeling of implementing agencies is taking place in order to increase 
trust. For instance, in 1991 France recreated ANDRA (National Radioactive Waste 
Management Agency) as a new agency independent of the Atomic Energy Commissariat 
and other waste producers. The 1998 Seaborn Committee Report to the government of 
Canada and recommended the establishment of a new management agency “at arms 
length from the utilities and AECL (Atomic Energy of Canada, Limited), with the sole 
purpose of managing and coordinating the full range of activities relating to the long-term 
management of nuclear fuel wastes . . . subject to . . . policy direction from the federal 
government, and to regular public review, preferably by parliament” (CEAA, 1998, p. 3). 
Plans are being made in the United Kingdom to hold a public consultation to address 
options for waste management, including how to make Nirex an independent organization 
(Observer, 2000).
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E. Risk Communication for the Siting Procedure 
To solve this conflict between announcing agents and the public, the 
communication strategy begins by listening to the public and moving in a more 
acceptable direction. Risk communication is an interactive process of exchange of 
information and opinion on risk among risk assessors, risk managers, and other interested 
parties. Working the crowd is essential for a technology such as nuclear energy, which 
depends on the public's acceptance to host plants, invest in industry firms, and support 
government subsidies and loan guarantees. Proponents want the world to believe that the 
public will be increasingly open to an energy source which directly produces no 
greenhouse gases, while opponents want the world to believe that the public will 
increasingly fear accidents, cost overruns, the uncertain future of nuclear waste, and the 
diversion of weapon-grade material to bomb making. Therefore, management must 
consider communication in all activities. (Baruch, 2009) In this case, the policy to 
construct a radioactive waste disposal system was postponed repeatedly in spite of all the 
government's efforts during many years. Finally, in 2005, it was concluded to that a site in 
Gyeong-ju city should be selected at after 20 years of conflict and enmity.  
 If the nuclear energy industry is to be regarded as a responsible partner with the 
public, it must change the way it communicates. (Greg, 2011) Corporate management 
must think of its external communications as key parts of the firm's activity, and not as an 
undesirable necessity. Rowan
64
 has identified five possible goals of risk communication. 
They are: building trust in the communicator; raising awareness (e.g. of a potential 
hazard); educating; reaching agreement (e.g. on a particular strategy for cleaning up a 
hazardous waste site); and motivating action (e.g. encouraging people to practice safe sex 
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or reduce the levels of radon in their homes). Because of this multiplicity of purposes, 
different strategies of risk communication may be appropriate for different goals. For 
example, simple vivid risk communication messages are best for raising awareness, while 
stakeholder participation methods are likely to be more appropriate for reaching 
agreement on a course of action. Even the measures of success may vary depending on 
the purpose of the risk communication effort. 
 The multiplicity of risk communication purposes and measures of success means 
that the process of needs assessment should be prioritized before the actual undertaking of 
a risk communication effort. Needs assessment consists of answering a series of questions 
in the process of planning a risk communication effort. It is intended to be fairly general 
Ð , that is, to help risk communicators think through the who, what, and why of their need 
to communicate risk analysis results or risk-informed regulatory decisions before 
designing specific risk communication messages. For example, Lundgren & McMakin
65
 
noted that the scope of a risk communication message may be constrained by legal 
requirements, institutional policies, and audience characteristics, all of which need to be 
understood.  
 Accumulated experience throughout many countries and a growing body of 
social science research indicate pathways for improved siting strategies. A set of “siting 
guidelines”66 highlights the issues that a process of siting hazardous facilities should 
expect to encounter. These guidelines should not be regarded as an operational manual for 
siting or as any sort of “ultimate” answer to managing a siting process. The guidelines are 
intended simply as useful advice drawn from experience on siting hazardous facilities in a 
number of countries.  
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 The guidelines address three key features of any siting process. The first set 
relates to goals and objectives: instituting a wide participatory process, seeking consent 
that the status quo is not acceptable, and working to develop trust. The second set 
concerns appropriate outcomes: choosing the best solution to the problem, guaranteeing 
that stringent safety standards will be met, fully addressing negative aspects of the project, 
making the community better off, and using contingent agreements. The third set relates 
to appropriate processes: using a volunteer system (even one of competitive bidding), 
aiming for geographic fairness in burden sharing, setting realistic planning schedules, and 
keeping a range of options open at all times. (Lesbirel & Shaw, 2000)  
 
 
V. Conclusion 
Through the comparative study between cases of various countries, this study 
covered conflicts around the selection of a nuclear waste disposal site. The study also 
reviewed how the risk communication played a role in resolving environmental conflict. 
One additional puzzle remains, namely to identify the reason why many approaches to 
site selection have failed and how the Gyeong-ju managed to achieve consensus. 
The Roh government introduced an ‘innovation framework’ paradigm to enhance 
economic autonomy. He recognized this conflict as resulting from failure of centralized 
decision making processes which excludes local government and civil society. He 
therefore attempted to initiate innovative framework through which to develop horizontal 
decision making, a regional competition system and democratic policies such as the 
referendum. The central government evaluated the competitiveness of local government 
and provided a discriminative incentive. This competitive framework led to infinite 
competition among local governments – local governments tried to procure national 
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projects which guaranteed stable investment.   
Discussions regarding factors affecting the site selection of radioactive waste 
management disposal can be categorized as the provision of economic incentive, public 
participation on policy decision making and the difference of risk identification. To solve 
this conflict, it is necessary to understand differences on an ideological basis of pros and 
cons.
67
 In essence, supporting a particular side is based on neutral techno-centeredness. 
They regard nuclear waste as an unavoidable by-product which results from the resolution 
of an energy problem. They believe that the development of science and technology as 
well as accurate information provision can solve the problem of site selection. In contrast, 
the arguments of opposing sides are based on ecology. They feel that the crisis of human 
civilization has resulted from excessive use of technologies and that only an ecological 
approach can solve this problem. From their perspective, a ‘social consensus on non-
nuclear energy’ is the priority, as it would allow for safe management steps to be taken 
towards the efficient use of existing nuclear power plant sites.
68
  
This site selection issue could well lead to environmental damage, the violation 
of property rights and change of local economy.
69
 It is the NIMBY facility which could 
cause negative externality - noise, damage to health, destruction of nature and a fall in the 
economy of certain regions. Meanwhile, it could also distribute benefits to a broad range 
of national territories, and thus cause an imbalance of the cost-benefit situation.
70
 If there 
is no economic incentive to residents of sites, this will arouse resistance. When the 
government utilize this economic incentive, fairness of distribution is important as well as 
                                           
67 Jin Seok Jeon, “The study on Policy Change for Building the Nuclear Waste Dump through Advocacy 
Coalition Framework”, Study of Local Government, Korean Local Government Society, Vol.7, No.4 (2003).  
68 Sohee Kim, “ Remained task and significance of demonstration against the radioactive waste disposal 
site in Gulup Island”, Environment and Life (1995). 
69 Paul Slovic and others, “Perceived Risk, Trust, and the politics of Nuclear Waste” Sciences 254 (1991). 
70 Soonae Park, Jihan Lee, “Policy Failures: Siting a Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility in South Korea), 
Environmental Policy, Vol.13, No.2 (2005) : 90 
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the amount of finance. Ranking incentive according to the distance from the main facility 
is difficult, and neighboring districts may be dissatisfied. The Korean government 
recognized the importance of economic incentive after the first failure of 1986. From the 
zero base, the amount of special fund has been increased rapidly – 90 billion won in 1990, 
125 billion won in 1994, and 300 billion won in the final decision. 
One of the characteristic features of radioactive waste is the uncertainty of risk. 
Expert says that it is contained within safe radiation shielding in an iron drum with 
concrete, and a thorough monitoring system is in operation. However, it is impossible to 
prove safety perfectly, and these risk factors can be linked to serious problems such as 
irreversibility of recovery, wide scope and long term effect of damage.
71
 The human 
perception of radiation risk can itself lead to physical, psychological, social and economic 
harm, often regardless of the radiological harm itself. Risk communication is a tool used 
for managing these risks, and should be given much greater emphasis at the most senior 
levels of any organization concerned with the peaceful application of nuclear science. 
(Ropeik, 2008
)
 With regards to this selection of a site, the local government promoted 
public relations but residents suffered from information asymmetry. The information from 
the opposing side was not delivered effectively.
72
   
 As we can see in ‘Incentive policies to site hazardous facilities’ (Kunreuther, 
1991), the resistance of residents showed similar features regarding the developing 
decision. Throughout the process, we bore witness to undemocratic procedures, closed 
information sharing, concerns with safety, declines in trust level regarding transparency 
and oppressive action toward residents. The policy acceptance level is determined on the 
base of trust between residents and policy executors, and decision making processes 
                                           
71 Dong-Gun Byun, “Matter of energy policy and radioactive waste management policy in south Korea” 
2000).  
72 Sun-Jin Yun, “The construction of radioactive waste management facility : Current Status and Issues”, 
Energy Focus (2005).  
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should have openness and transparency. The level of awareness regarding risk also differs 
between experts and residents. According to the survey on assessment of risk, residents 
regard the leakage of radiation as seriously as the crisis of nuclear war.
73
 In the early 
stage of site selection, the government led the discussion unilaterally, but after the failure 
on Anmyon island, they started to promote public relations in order to gather the opinions 
of local government and residents from the 3rd plan for site selection. However, this 
framework could not identify the core needs of residents, and thus the government 
attempted to compose a committee from the 4th plan. This committee was also limited to 
the materialization of economic incentive, rather than for collecting public opinions, 
meaning that it failed to achieve solid trust from residents. Through the 5th and 6th plan, 
the discussion framework was also enlarged to all related governmental organizations, 
foundations, local politicians and NGOs. It enhanced the institutional framework as well 
as the diversity of discussions and acceptance of residents.   
                                           
73 Yearn-Hong Choi, Young-Min Oh, “A longitudinal survey of public acceptance of radioactive waste 
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